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d rees a 
brief. Respondent's brief pts pai a picture 
relationship between John and Nancy ( nvolving is a ppy su 
ere John and Nancy communicate well, are flexible n th r schedu 
that John is respectful and com imentary of Nancy, and that RB is a 
happy and well adjusted child. This is simply untrue. Nancy 1s testimony, 
combined with the conclusions of the GAL (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2), I a 
completely different story. Instead, Nancy and John only communicate to 
resolve scheduling issues involving the current custody order, and the 
tension involving RB in this relationship continues. The trial showed a 
complete disruption of the family unit with John 1s disproportionate purchase 
of toys and gifts for RB, John's Disneyland trips, John inappropriately 
recording RB 1s conversation, nutrition issues, and Nancy's testimony of RB 1s 
tension when returning from visits with John. This is simply an unhappy 
family situation. John 1s statement to the GAL that "when RB is older, he will 
choose to live with him 1', sums up John 1s entire position, and shows a non-
parent in competition with RB's parents. A non-parent is interfering with the 
right of the natural parents to raise their child. John's attempted smear 
campaign against Ralph at trial created more evidence of his intent. The 
hea of this case is the fundamental right of a parent to make their 
own choices as when their child should see a non-parent when the 
are u or never aba the child. Nancy made 
clear at trial she is not initially trying to terminate RB 1s contact with John, 
but she wants full control of the situation, as she would with any aunt, uncle, 
or neighbor. 
In terms of the legal issues, Respondent's brief leaves unanswered the 
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na 
rty. fol 
a) case cou 
a is case is d ngu 
versus "custody, a d) any custody (or 
without Ralph being named as an indispensab 
ng arguments address these issues more closely. 
1. It is nonsensical for the Respondent to argue he has no 
custody rights in this case, yet at the same time rely on Stockwell v. 
Stockwell to allow his visitation rights. On page 12 of his brief1 
Respondent stated that "John has never sought custody. He has never 
litigated custody. He has never received custody." Respondent1s brief takes 
great pains to distinguish someone seeking "custody" instead of seeking 
"visitation". The court in Stockwell v. Stockwell, 116 Idaho 297, 775 
P.2d 611 (1989) made clear that Stockwell cases involved custody cases. 
No Stockwell cases address visitation issues as defined by the Respondent 
in his brief. Stockwell stands for the proposition that where a child has 
been in the custody of a non-parent for an appreciable period of time (years) 
to the exclusion of the parents due to their unfitness or abandonment, the 
''custody·" of the child can be avvarded that party by an Idaho court if the 
best interest of the child so dictates. Again, the few Stockwell cases 
involve situations where a non-parent was effectively the sole custodian of 
the child, to the exclusion of the parents, for a number of years. Throughout 
all of his arguments the Respondent still cannot connect the facts of this 
case to the Stockwell line of cases. Ralph and Nancy never were deemed 
unfit or abandoned RB. RB was never in the sole independent custody of 
John, much less for years. He was a stepparent, and a stepparent who was 
put on notice early in RB's life that he was not the natural father of RB. 
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m can u 
u ca a 
or visitation John nder the Stockwell. 
can I find no cases cited ich g a non-parent the 
m a rights to a child "under color Stockwell". "under 
fi ng by the Magistrate, which was upheld by the District Court, and now 
argued Respondent, completely reinvents Stockwell and fully transforms 
a I future custody and visitation cases in the State of Idaho. The term 
nder color of Stockwell" seems to be disguised la uage meaning either a) 
"we should give a non-parent custody or visitation with this child due to r 
bo ing and attachment"; or b) "we should apply a best interest of the child 
standard to non-parents in determining custody or visitation rights". Both of 
these themes simply do not exist in Idaho law. It is a huge leap of logic to 
jump from Stockwell case law to a court granting a non-parent visitation 
rights "under color of Stockwell". Respectfully, the Magistrate and District 
Court ignored the foundational basis of Stockwell, and the Respondent 
ho originally never argued "under color of Stockwell") now supports that 
conclusion. Separately 1 Respondent in his brief appears to apply a separate 
"best interest of e child 1' standard for non-parents by using the terms 
"bonded'\ "special attachment", and "attachment'1 • This again is not allowed 
by Idaho iaw I as the six proceedings discussed in Appellant's first brief do 
not allow such a process. The Idaho legislature has not created a stepparent 
custody rig but Respondent is attempting to do so in is case. The 
"under color of Stockwell" and "best interest of the child" arguments in this 
case are simply not supported by any Idaho statute or case law. Such 
concepts also contradict the ruling of Troxell v. Granville, 530 US 57 
(2000) 1 where the court struck down the statute broadly allowing anyone to 
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a 
specific 
a cou 
mes from the pa 
ndoned child. 
a 
of Stockwell to request 
even though parents are fit a 
3. Magistrate, District Court a the Respondent stm have 
not distinguished the terms"custodyu and "visitationrr, or why such a 
distinction is important to their argument in this case. The basis of 
the decision by the Magistrate, District Court and the Respondent are that 
John on received "visitation" and not "custody 1' this case. The 
undersigned is still confused as to e pure distinction between the two 
terms, and why that distinction exists for the Respondent or the underlying 
courts. Visitation is a form of custody, but beyond that there is no clear 
distinction between the two in Idaho law. The term "visitation" has long 
been intermixed with "custody" for non-primary parents for many years in 
Idaho cases and divorce decrees. There is no statute defining the difference 
between the two terms. The District Court stressed that John was awarded 
decisions affecting a child 1s religion, schooling, diet, etc. If (Memorandum 
Opinion, p. 6). There was no legal cite given for such statement. Isn 1t the 
difference between visitation and custody really just a matter of semantics? 
Whether John is perceived to have visitation or custody, the cou ordered 
times he has RB in his possession are "blackout/f times to Ralph and Nancy 
for their control over RB. During his time with RB, Nancy has very 
control or knowledge of what John does with RB. John can take RB to a 
church that John wants. It is difficult to enforce any dietary or nutrition 
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ca d me 
can n a 
during his overnight and duri his summer 
ned simply does not understand this distinction of "John never 
custody, on received visitation" (ln add a argu 
on received visitation through the Stockwell I of custody 
. The District Court even blurred this issue more in his Memora um 
Opinion stating "Child custody determinations are committed to the sou 
iscretion of the Magistrate Judge." (Memorandum Opinion, p. 3). Why was 
is case law mentioned if this is not a custody case? The District Court in 
h o n even recognized that Stockwell involved "custody disputes\ but 
d address any connection between Stockwell and visitation rights. In 
sum 1 the Magistrate and the District Court claim this is not a custody case, 
used custody case law as a basis for r opinions. 
The ndamentai right to parent your child to the exclusion 
non-parents is one of the most important rights involving the 
child. Appellant 1s original brief addressed the six proceedings in Idaho for 
ich a non-parent could possibly obtain custody~ Respondent 1s brief does 
not appear to challenge that list, but instead primarily relies upon the "under 
color of Stockwel 1' analysis combined with Nancy 1s initial consent. The 
reco is devoid of any knowiedge by Nancy of Stockweii at the initial 
divorce ring. Nor was Ral made a party to this proceeding despite the 
Magistrate's knowledge of the separate custody case involving Nancy and 
Ralph. Again, Nancy entered into this stipulation with its handwritten 
changes as a last minute agreement before trial commenced. A void 
judgment can be attacked at any time, even when entered by stipulation. To 
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n 
were 
cases have 
to a proceed 
case a 
a and father 
custody or 
The Respondent 1s brief address the issue of why 
there are no Idaho cases invo ng custody or visitation of a chi where both 
parents were not made pa to the action. shou have been made 
a pa to the original divorce case between Nancy and John. Ralph should 
have been made a party to the motion to mod is not Ralph's 
responsibility to inject himself nto ese actions; it was the responsibi of 
Respondent or court to ma Ralph a party because he is a parent of 
RB. Ra ph was an indispensable pa in 
a motion to intervene in the present case 1 a 
it was not his duty to make himself a pa 
cases. Ralph original made 
he withdrew such motion, as 
The Magistrate, despite the 
withdrawal of the motion to intervene, ied his motion, basically on the 
grounds that he testified at trial and was protected by Nancy 1s position. 
There are no cases known to the undersigned of a custody proceeding (or 
.. !-!J...-J..!--- ----------..-!:--\; VJ:::dldl1UI l J-Jf Ul..t:!tUH 1'.d) I _.,...., ...., rh 1/""i JI~ a '.....il :u both pa rents were not made 
parties. Aside from the due process issues already discussed in the original 
brief, there are numerous practical p ems of not ind ing Ralph as a 
pa which were not addressed by the Respondent ( or the Magistrate or 
District Cou . John 1s court-ordered custody rig visitation rights) 
RB certainly are not binding upon Ralph as he was and is not a party to 
either proceeding. Without Ralph being a party in the case, John has no 
remedies, contempt or otherwise, against Ralph if Ralph as custodian of RB 
directs Nancy not to allow John to see RB. What remedies does John have if 
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Ralph and Nancy modify their custody order to give Ralph custody times of 
RB overlapping John's custody times with Nancy? What if Nancy gives Ralph 
sole custody It is still fasci that John's towards Ra 
in this case Ralph need not be a party, yet at tria a in 
Respondent's John continues to try to destroy Ralph character by 
raising issues of Ralph's parenting skills with his daughters (which was not 
true). Why does John continually try to destroy Ralph's character, yet not 
want him to be a party to this action? The answer is simple; this confirms 
John's statement to the GAL that "he is a better parent than Ralph", and 
enforces the GAL's opinion that John feels he is in competition with Ralph for 
RB. This treatment of Ralph by the Respondent only makes more clear why 
it is critical why the court system should not grant custody of visitation rights 
to non-parents, except in the narrow confines of the six Idaho proceedings. 
In conclusion the decisions by the courts that the prior custody order 
was valid the inclusion of Ralph as a party, and that Ralph does not 
need to be a party to a proceeding involving his own child, drastically 
changes the due process concepts of Idaho law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24-ctay o 
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